This paper contends that the USAF learned valuable lessons from recent expeditionary campaigns such as Operation Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom. The early days saw combat aircraft arriving at forward operating bases well in advance of their combat support. Information obtained from the Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC) and secondary sources (e.g. RAND reports, Air University Library papers, and books) reveal the following arguments: 1) currently the USAF does not foster "jointness" between service branches; 2) airpower's inefficient beddown operations with joint forces necessitates newer concepts for the Air Expeditionary Force mission; 3) Air Expeditionary Forces have not solved the difficult lessons learned for improvement in equipment, command and control, and decision processes which exist still today and inhibit flexibility on the battlefield; and 4) airmen have successfully overcame challenges in the field but these Air Expeditionary Forces must become more agile to respond to contingencies in the future. Such arguments make it clear that the USAF must meet the demanding deployment schedules, while ensuring Air Expeditionary Forces are able to operate more effectively in joint and coalition environments.